Defining Science

There is this constant argument going on between pro- and anti-evolutionist groups. That argument centers around the definition of science, with both sides charging the other with trading in ideology rather than science. Standing at the center of the debate is the nature of scientific study itself.

I am not a scientist, though I like reading about science. That means that there is much I don't know. So, I hadn't thought about it before reading Karl Giberson's Saving Darwin (HarperOne, 2008), but I think I finally understand why we keep having such unfruitful discussions about evolution. The problem is that our definition of the scientific method essentially derives from physics, but biology, and with it evolution, isn't quite the same thing as physics.

Giberson notes that many creationists and Intelligent Design theorists like to point to a definition set out by Karl Popper, the philosopher of science, and a method modeled by Einstein's theory of relativity. Einstein had set out the principle of relativity, suggesting that light would be warped by space. An astronomer picked up on the challenge, tested it, and proved to be correct.

Giberson notes that Popper took this situation and based his own definition of science upon it. Giberson writes, according to Popper:

All genuinely scientific theories, he argued, must make novel predictions about unknown phenomena. These predictions must be articulated so clearly that they can be conclusively refuted by observation. And if the predictions fail, the theory has been falsified. If a theory cannot make such falsifiable predictions, then it cannot claim to be scientific (p. 186).

Because evolutionary theory is complex and dependent on history, it didn't lend itself well to Popper's definition, leading him to declare Darwinism, along with Marxism and Freudianism, pseudosciences.

Creationists have picked up on this and charged that evolution is not science but ideology. Now as Giberson points out, Popper later recanted, but Creationists and ID folk don't note that change of heart. Unfortunately, many supporters of evolution make use of this same definition in arguing against Creationism and ID -- so both sides are making major mistakes.

The problem here is that the combatants are applying principles that derive from physics and apply them to biology. Physics, unlike biology, lends itself well to such a principle.

Physical theories present their conclusions in tidy mathematical equations -- think E=mc2. The relevant phenomena can be demonstrated in laboratory experiments and in public displays at science museums. Impressive technological spin-offs bathe the underlying science in the warm glow of credibility. Evolution, alas, offers nothing but vague generalities -- "the fittest survive" -- and invokes entities like "common ancestors" or processes like "speciation," for which the evidence is often depressingly small and indirect. . . . (p. 188).

He goes onto note that the disciplines are quite different and so the definitions don't apply equally. Physics is simple and thus words like elegance and beauty fit well. Their theories are neat and testable, but biology is quite different. So, here we have conundrum -- how do we define science? Not as easy to do as we once thought!